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July 9, 2008

Dirigo Health Agency  
Attn: [Ruth.A.Burke@maine.gov](mailto:Ruth.A.Burke@maine.gov)  
Dirigo Health Agency  
53 State House Station  
Augusta, Maine 04333-0053

In Re: Determination of Aggregate Measurable Cost Savings  
For The Fourth Assessment Year (2009)

**FILING COVERSHEET**

Dear Ms. Theberge:

Enclosed for filing please find the following:

SUBMITTED BY: Christopher T. Roach  
DATE: July 9, 2008  
DOCUMENT TITLE: Non-Confidential Version of Prefiled Testimony of  
Vincent Maffei  
DOCUMENT TYPE: Prefiled Testimony  
CONFIDENTIAL: **NO**

Thank you for your assistance in this matter.

Very truly yours,

Christopher T. Roach

# NON-CONFIDENTIAL

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STATE OF MAINE  
DIRIGO HEALTH AGENCY

IN RE: ) EXHIBIT 3  
)  
)  
DETERMINATION OF AGGREGATE )  
MEASURABLE COST SAVINGS FOR ) PREFILED TESTIMONY OF  
THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT YEAR ) VINCENT MAFFEI  
(2009) )  
)  
**Docket No.** )  
) July 9, 2008  
)

NON-CONFIDENTIAL

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1 **Q. Please state your name and your position with WellPoint, Inc.**

2 A. My name is Vincent Maffei and I am a Senior Biostatistician and Health Economist in the  
3 Advanced Analytics and Innovation Department in WellPoint's Connecticut office.

4

5 **Q. Please describe any relevant experience that qualifies you as a witness in this**  
6 **proceeding.**

7 A. As reflected in my curriculum vitae, attached to this testimony as Maffei Exhibit  
8 A, I received my Bachelor of Arts degree in economics from Rutgers University in 1973,  
9 and my Masters degree in economics from Rutgers in 1980. I also completed all graduate  
10 courses and PhD qualifying exams in the PhD program of the Department of Economics  
11 at New York University. Before joining WellPoint in 1987, I was an Assistant Professor  
12 at William Paterson University and taught courses in finance, econometrics, statistics and  
13 economics. In my position at WellPoint, I am responsible for predictive modeling,  
14 econometric forecasting of health care costs and membership, economic forecasting,  
15 testing, hypotheses on health care/cost interventions, provider evaluation and outcome  
16 analysis.

17

18 **Q. Please summarize your background and experience that qualifies you to provide**  
19 **this testimony.**

20 A. My background in both econometric forecasting and health economics uniquely qualify  
21 me to opine on whether the regression methodologies proposed by the Dirigo Health Agency  
22 ("DHA") satisfy the scientific standards applicable to regression analyses and in the first instance  
23 are appropriate to determine the aggregate measurable cost savings that are within the Dirigo  
24 Health Reform Act ("AMCS").

25 For the first 14 year of my working career I taught statistics and econometrics at William  
26 Paterson, Rutgers, and other Universities. At WellPoint, I have spent the last 20 years testing  
27 hypotheses about health care interventions, as well as modeling and forecasting health care costs.  
28 I have also had the opportunity to expand my learning at professional conferences. Additionally,  
29 I have also been a presenter at some of those conferences. My presentations to Actuaries have

1 included how to properly run regressions and do tests of hypotheses, and also how to avoid the  
2 common mistakes and pitfalls in both. In practice I have been instrumental in developing  
3 econometric models that forecast health care costs and membership for WellPoint states. These  
4 models have been tested for accuracy and found reliable. They are now routinely run every  
5 month in every WellPoint state for every large block of business. My tests of hypotheses and  
6 estimates of savings on internal and external cost of care interventions have been relied upon by  
7 WellPoint's management to decide whether or not to continue funding programs and set rate  
8 reductions in anticipation of savings.

9

10 **Q. What is the purpose of your testimony?**

11 A. The purpose of my testimony is to (1) provide background on the elements in and  
12 purpose of a statistical regression; (2) explain the concept of statistical significance and  
13 the test of hypotheses that determine if the estimated coefficients are reliable; (3) evaluate  
14 the regression equations advanced by DHA's consultant schramm raleigh Health Strategy  
15 ("srHS") and explain (a) how model mis-specification and violations of regression  
16 requirements render as invalid the srHS model, the statistical results and the conclusions  
17 drawn from those results, and (b) where the critical Maine Dirigo variables used in the  
18 regression fail the most basic statistical test of significance; and (4) evaluate the  
19 appropriateness of the sample/cluster utilized by srHS to estimate the coefficients that are  
20 used to calculate Dirigo "savings."

21

22 **Q. Have you reviewed srHS proposed regression analysis?**

23 A. Yes.

24

25 **Q. Please summarize your opinions of that analysis.**

26 A. 1) srHS uses an approach that has been used previously to analyze individual hospital  
27 costs. This approach, however, is inappropriate to model an entire health care system and leads  
28 to invalid results. Moreover, the srHS regression analysis is fatally flawed and cannot be

1 considered as a valid measure of cost savings that result from Dirigo. The variable “Dirigo” is in  
2 fact neither the “Dirigo Health Reform Act” or the “Dirigo Health Agency.” It is, instead,  
3 simply a variable that separates the data into two time periods: the period up to and including  
4 state fiscal year 2003 and the period after state fiscal year 2003. In addition, the equations  
5 include variables which are not statistically significant and should have been removed from the  
6 final model. Instead, those statistically insignificant variables (MDD and MDYDD) which  
7 were critical for Dirigo savings were retained and used in the calculation of “Dirigo” savings.  
8 The srHS approach, accordingly, is not valid.

9 2) In addition to including variables that should have been removed using proper statistical  
10 techniques, both the U.S. and the Cluster 1 models fail to include economic and financial  
11 variables that are important drivers of costs in a healthcare system--variables such as  
12 employment growth and hospital operating margin. The omission of important explanatory  
13 factors can very well lead to biased estimates for the coefficients of the included variables (*i.e.*,  
14 the impact of the omitted variables can be falsely correlated to the variables that were included).

15 3) For a regression to be appropriate for an analysis, the random component (*i.e.*, the error  
16 terms) must be “independently and identically distributed,” referred to herein as “iid.” The srHS  
17 regression used pooled time series and cross-sectional data. Since autocorrelation (where the  
18 error term in one time period influences the error term in the ensuing period) is a common  
19 problem in time series data, researchers using time series data should always test for and correct  
20 for autocorrelation. To my knowledge srHS did not test for autocorrelation. Heteroskedasticity  
21 (where the variance of the error term is typically proportional to the value of the dependant or  
22 some explanatory variable) is a common problem in cross-sectional data. Researchers using  
23 cross-sectional data should always test for and correct for heteroskedasticity. To my knowledge  
24 srHS did not. Additionally, the error terms for all hospitals in each state are correlated since  
25 hospitals within a state react to changing state economic and regulatory conditions in a similar  
26 manner. The violation of the iid assumption renders the t statistics from the regressions invalid.

27

28 4) Additionally, the Cluster 1 “sample” that was selected has undesirable and unusual  
29 characteristics that make it a poor choice as a sample or benchmark. Worse yet is the manner in

1 which Cluster 1 was selected. srHS selected states where (we are told) the coefficients of some  
2 of the dependent variables are similar to those for Maine. Because srHS selected observations  
3 that are similar the resulting error terms (actual value minus predicted) are not independent.  
4 These error terms are used to calculate the standard errors in the regression output. The standard  
5 errors are used to calculate the t statistics. The t statistics are used to determine statistical  
6 significance. If the error terms are correlated then the standard errors will be biased estimates  
7 (biased downwards) of the true variance. The t statistics (that standard statistical software  
8 automatically generate) will be overstated and, accordingly, those statistics are invalid to  
9 determine the statistical significance of the regression results. Any conclusions about Maine  
10 drawn from the Cluster 1 sample are simply invalid.

11 Below I will describe these flaws, each of which independently would render the srHS model  
12 highly suspect, but together demonstrate that the model put forward by DHA is simply not valid.

13

14 **Q. Before explaining how the critical srHS regression results are statistically**  
15 **insignificant, please explain the purpose of a statistical regression.**

16 A. A statistical regression is commonly used for hypothesis testing, estimation, and  
17 forecasting. The advantage of using a properly specified multi-variate approach (*i.e.*,  
18 regression) over a univariate approach (such as pre and post comparison of average cost)  
19 is that the multi-variate approach provides an opportunity to account for the multitude of  
20 other factors that may be correlated with changes in the dependent variable (*e.g.*, average  
21 cost). The statistics generated by the regression calculations enable us to apply the basic  
22 hypothesis test to every explanatory variable: Does that variable influence the dependent  
23 variable or does it have no effect? In the case of the regression analysis proposed by the  
24 Dirigo Health Agency through srHS, the question is whether the purported explanatory  
25 variable labeled “Dirigo” (in reality a pre/post SFY 2003 variable) and MDD, and  
26 MDD have any correlation to the dependent variable, CMAD cost. By casting  
27 variables as ‘explanatory’ the developer of the model presumes causality. Unfortunately,  
28 the regression analysis merely merely detects correlation between dependant and  
29 explanatory variables, it does not prove causality.

1

2 **Q. What do you mean that the developer of the model presumes causality?**

3 A. It is improper to suggest that regression analysis is capable of determining  
4 attribution or causal effect. Instead, we can only say that a regression on a properly  
5 specified model that fullfills all the fundamental asumptions underlying the regression  
6 methodology can establish a correlation between a target variable (i.e. the ‘dependant’  
7 variable) and the “explanatory” variables. This may provide support for a hypothesis  
8 about causality, but it does not prove it. By placing an important factor on the right hand  
9 side of the regression equation and referring to it as an “explanatory” variable most  
10 researchers assume that changes in the right hand side variables “cause” changes in the  
11 left hand (i.e. dependant) variable. Unfortunately, too many researchers assume that  
12 statistical evidence of correlation proves causality. All too often subsequent research has  
13 shown that both the dependant and independent variables moved in response to a third  
14 unknown or unobserved variable. Many a forecaster has discovered that while the  
15 relationship between the unobserved causal variable and the supposed explanatory  
16 variable was constant for the estimation period, this relationship diverged in the forecast  
17 period. Since the forecaster had unknowingly attributed causality to the wrong variable,  
18 his predictions were incorrect.

19

20 **Q. What do you mean by “properly specified”?**

21 A. “Properly specified” in the context of a regression analysis means that the model  
22 must include all factors or events (in their appropriate mathematical form and with the  
23 correct lag time for their impact) that could have an impact on the dependant variable  
24 (again, in this case, the dependent variable would be the cost per CMAD). Omission of a  
25 factor which has an appreciable impact on the dependant variable will not only represent  
26 a missed opportunity to more accurately estimate (or forecast), it may well lead to biased  
27 estimates of the coefficients of the included explanatory variables. Put differently, if the  
28 regression analysis mis-specifies the factors that are necessary to measure the dependent  
29 variable, the analysis will be inherently unreliable. Some or all of the impact of the

1 omitted variables can be assigned to the included variables generating biased estimates of  
2 the true impact of the included variables.

3 It is also important that factors or events that have no appreciable impact on the  
4 dependent variable be excluded from the final form of the model. Since it is almost  
5 impossible to determine in advance which of the many candidates for “explanatory  
6 factors” are legitimate, the only way to determine which variables are legitimate is to try  
7 all logical candidates in the regression and to evaluate the resulting t statistics.

8

9 **Q. Before continuing with your testimony, please explain what a “coefficient” and  
10 “t statistic” are in the context of a regression analysis.**

11 A. A “coefficient” in a regression analysis is the estimated value which tells us how  
12 many units the dependent variable will change (and in the positive or negative direction)  
13 in response to a one unit change in the explanatory variable with which the coefficient is  
14 associated. A “t statistic” in a regression analysis is used to calculate the statistical  
15 significance of the coefficient. It tells us if the coefficient could have been generated by  
16 random variation, or if there is little chance that random variation could have generated  
17 the value. If the coefficient is large relative to the random variation associated with the  
18 explanatory variable (given by the Standard Error in the regression output) then there is  
19 little chance that random variation could have generated such a relatively large value, and  
20 the absolute value of the t statistic will exceed the critical level associated with statistical  
21 significance. For completeness sake the formula for a t statistic is:

22 
$$t = \frac{((Estimated\_Coefficient) - (Hypothesized\_Value))}{StdError}$$

23 Where the Hypothesized Value = 0 (*i.e.*, there is no relationship between dependent and  
24 explanatory variable) is the basic hypothesis that is used to generate the probability (or  
25 significance) figures in all standard regression output.

26

1 **Q. How do you determine which candidates for explanatory factors are**  
2 **legitimate?**

3 A. The inherent randomness in numerical measures assures that there will always be  
4 at least some spurious correlation between any two variables. By way of example, the  
5 the number of black flies per acre in the northern Maine woods and the daily closing  
6 prices of the Dow Jones Industrial Average will often show some correlation  
7 notwithstanding that they are entirely unrelated variables. It is common to refer to  
8 correlation generated by random variation as spurious correlation. Any spurious  
9 correlation between a dependent variable and potential explanatory variable will increase  
10  $R^2$ .  $R^2$  is a measure of how much of the variation in the dependent variable is accounted  
11 for by changes in the explanatory variables. ( $R^2$  ranges in value from 0 to 100%.) To  
12 validate a regression analysis, statisticians need to ensure that the estimated relationship  
13 between the dependent and explanatory variable (*i.e.*, the estimated coefficient) is stronger  
14 than that which can be generated by spurious correlation. The customary method is to  
15 evaluate the t statistic associated with each explanatory variable. This amounts to a test  
16 of the hypothesis that the explanatory variable has no more effect on the dependent  
17 variable than could be explained by random variation. Keeping with our example, a  
18 statistician would analyze whether the t statistic associated with black flies has an effect  
19 on the Dow Jones prices greater than that which is generated by random variation. It is  
20 customary to reject that hypothesis and keep the explanatory variable in the model only if  
21 the absolute value of the t statistic is large enough to indicate that there is less than a 5%  
22 chance that the value of the coefficient could have been generated by random variation.  
23 If there is at least a 5% chance that the value of the coefficient could have been generated  
24 by random variation, that explanatory variable is deemed to be statistically insignificant  
25 (*i.e.*, invalid as a factor that may explain change in the dependent variable).

26

27 **Q. Is the  $R^2$  test alone sufficient to evaluate the validity of a model?**

28 A. No,  $R^2$  alone is not sufficient to evaluate the validity of a regression model. As  
29 previously mentioned,  $R^2$  will always increase even if there is only weak, spurious

1 correlation between dependent and additional explanatory variables. Indeed, the concept  
2 of adjusted  $R^2$  (sometimes referred to as “R bar squared”) was developed to counter the  
3 tendency of some researchers to include too many “explanatory” variables in order to  
4 increase  $R^2$  and give them reason to claim that the results are better than they truly are.  
5 If, in successive runs of a regression, adding one additional explanatory variable at a time,  
6 R bar squared does not increase, that is an indication that the relation between the  
7 dependent and the additional explanatory variable is so weak that it could be generated by  
8 spurious correlation or a high degree of multi-collinearity.

9 A better way to evaluate a model is to use a hold out sample (a.k.a. split sample). The 50  
10 states could have been divided into two randomly selected samples of 35 and 15 (or 30  
11 and 20). The coefficients of the model are then estimated using the larger sample and  
12 then applied to the smaller sample. Commonly accepted measures of predictive accuracy  
13 (**Root Mean Square Error** favored by econometricians or **Mean Absolute Percentage**  
14 **Error** favored by Actuaries) can be applied that evaluate the prediction error (actual value  
15 minus predicted) in the hold out sample. A good model is one that explains well in the  
16 sample used to estimate it and predicts well in the hold out sample. A model that  
17 explains well in the estimation sample, but does not predict well in the hold out sample is  
18 a poor model. Models that do not explain well in the estimation sample, but predict well  
19 in the hold out sample do so by fortuitous accident. Needless to say, they are not good  
20 models.

21 Even if the RMSE or MAPE indicate good model performance, the Dirigo savings still  
22 require unbiased estimation and statistical significance for the **MDD** and **MDYDD** terms.  
23 Without unbiased estimation and statistical significance in those key variables, the model  
24 cannot (and does not) produce valid results.

25

26 **Q. What is multi-collinearity?**


27 A. Multi-collinearity results when two or more explanatory variables move in  
28 unison. It is often impossible to separate out the individual impacts. Usually what

1 happens is that the calculations assign one of the co-linear variables the impact of both  
2 variables while the coefficient of the other variable appears as statistically insignificant.  
3 This means that if there is a high degree of multi-collinearity, the regression analysis may  
4 yield biased correlative results to one of the co-linear variables.

5

6 **Q. Why do statisticians generally agree that there must be less than a 5% chance that**  
7 **the value of the coefficient could have been generated by random variation in order for the**  
8 **explanatory variable to be statistically significant?**

9 A. All the coefficients calculated from sample statistics are only estimates of the true  
10 relationship between dependent and explanatory variables. Any sample is but one of many  
11 different possible samples that could have been selected. For example, if we randomly take a  
12 sample of six of the fifty states, there are millions of different combinations (or samples) that  
13 could have been selected. Due to randomness and subtle differences, each sample will generate  
14 its own estimate of the true relationship. Even if the true value is zero, those sample estimates  
15 will not be zero, they will be distributed around zero (see graph below). Most of the sample  
16 statistics will be close to zero but there will also be a number of samples that, because of random  
17 quirky combinations, have values notably different from zero.



18

19

In the standard 'null' hypothesis  $\beta = 0$ .

1 Traditionally we only take one random sample. Unfortunately, we do not know where in the  
2 distribution of all possible sample estimates our one sample and its estimated coefficient comes  
3 from. However, if the calculated t statistic has an absolute value of approximately 2.0 or greater  
4 (1.67 for a one tail test), then we know that there is only a 5% chance or less that we selected one  
5 of those quirky samples that lay in the tail of the distribution and has unusually large (or low)  
6 sample estimates.

7 If the t statistic calculated from your randomly selected sample is greater than 2.0, then the  
8 traditional conclusion is that, since the probability of getting one of those quirky samples is 5%  
9 or less, it is more reasonable to believe that the reason we have a sample estimate of a real (*i.e.*,  
10 non zero) association between the dependent and explanatory variable is because the relationship  
11 is truly non-zero. If the absolute value of the t statistic is less than 2.0 then the traditional  
12 conclusion is that the estimated relation between dependent and explanatory variable is small  
13 enough to be explained by random variation. In that event, we have failed to prove that a  
14 relationship really exists and the variable should be deleted from the model and other potential  
15 explanatory variables investigated.

16

17 **Q. Will you explain the concepts of the regression equation put forth by srHS and the**  
18 **meaning of the terms used in the equation?**

19 The srHS equation looks at how CMAD average cost changes over time. Time is considered a  
20 proxy for explanatory variables that change slowly and consistently over time (*e.g.*, an aging  
21 population). The ensuing testimony refers to the following table of statistical output from the  
22 srHS regression for all US hospitals for the years 2000 through 2007.

23 Table 1: Regression Output for Total US Hospital Analysis

24

	srHS	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		Collinearity Statistics		
		B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.	Tolerance	VIF
(Intercept)	847.9188	847.9188	105.2954		8.0528	0.0000		
Maine*	432.6228	432.6228	312.0161	0.0125	1.3865	0.1656	0.1808	5.5313
Dirigo	285.6101	285.6101	65.0775	0.0624	4.3888	0.0000	0.0722	13.8561
Year	268.5658	268.5658	11.3216	0.2681	23.7216	0.0000	0.1141	8.7630
Total.Beds	0.8724	0.8724	0.0315	0.1186	27.7298	0.0000	0.7975	1.2539
Interns.Beds	4528.4547	4528.4547	50.8485	0.4067	89.0578	0.0000	0.6990	1.4306
Rural.Indicator	-475.1056	-475.1056	25.7348	-0.0778	-18.4616	0.0000	0.8212	1.2177
..Days.Medicare	-1332.4051	-1332.4051	67.5437	-0.0916	-19.7266	0.0000	0.6754	1.4806
..Uninsured	32.4890	32.4890	2.2261	0.0606	14.5943	0.0000	0.8444	1.1842
Wage.Index	4364.3824	4364.3824	88.5942	0.1988	49.2626	0.0000	0.8954	1.1169
M:D*	-65.4460	-65.4460	990.3913	-0.0013	-0.0661	0.9473	0.0358	27.9588
M:Y*	130.7365	130.7365	167.0321	0.0158	0.7827	0.4338	0.0359	27.8371
Y:D	-61.9550	-61.9550	15.7172	-0.0776	-3.9419	0.0001	0.0376	26.6044
M:Y:D*	-32.2186	-32.2186	236.4283	-0.0037	-0.1363	0.8916	0.0199	50.2830

1  
2  
3  
4 **Q. Based on the table above that is reproduced from the srHS model, are any of the**  
5 **explanatory variables statistically significant?**

6 A. Yes. Below I will describe each of the statistically significant variables, what they are  
7 intended to determine, their calculated t statistics, and resulting statistical significance. Before  
8 doing so, however, I note that none of the variables that are critical to the “cost savings”  
9 calculation in the srHS model are statistically significant, which renders the srHS model invalid  
10 for that purpose. With that understanding, I will first describe those variables in the srHS model  
11 that are statistically significant.

12  
13 The “Year” variable clicks off the passage of time in annual increments. According to the  
14 coefficient estimates in the above table, CMAD rises by an average of \$268.57 every year. The t  
15 statistic for “Year” (23.72) is so large that there is no question that the correlation between the  
16 passage of time and the rise in CMAD is statistically significant. That is, the probability that this  
17 coefficient could have been generated by random variation is so small (it does not even register  
18 at the 4<sup>th</sup> decimal in the “Sig” column in Table 1) that it is highly likely that the trend is indeed  
19 around \$269 per year.

20  
21 The coefficient for “Total.Beds” indicates that each additional hospital bed adds \$ 0.87 to the  
22 CMAD average cost. Similar to the “Year” variable, the t statistic for “Total.Beds” (27.73) is so  
23 large that there is no question that this coefficient is a good estimate of the real value.

24 Statistically, there is no way the correlation could have been generated by random variation.  
25

1 The coefficient for “Interns.Beds” (*i.e.*, Interns & Residents per Bed) indicates that each  
2 additional Intern or Resident (per bed) adds \$ 4528.45 to the CMAD average cost. The t statistic  
3 for “Interns.Beds” (89.06) is so large that there is no way that random variation could have  
4 generated the result.

5  
6 The coefficient for “Days.Medicare” (*i.e.*, the ratio of Medicare days to total days) indicates that  
7 for every 1% point increase in that ratio lowers the CMAD by \$1332.41. The absolute value of  
8 the t statistic for “Days.Medicare” (-19.73) is also too large to conclude that random variation  
9 generated the result.

10

11 The coefficient for “Wage.Index” (*i.e.*, the ratio of the state’s average hourly wage to the  
12 national average) indicates that each 1% point increase in that ratio adds \$ 4364.38 to the CMAD  
13 average cost. The t statistic (49.26) indicates it too is statistically significant.

14

15 The coefficient for “Uninsured” (*i.e.*, the ratio of the uninsured population to total population)  
16 indicates that every 1% point change in that ratio changes the CMAD cost by \$32.49. The t  
17 statistic (14.59) indicates it is statistically significant. Since variation in State uninsured rates is  
18 very large (ranging from 25% in Texas to 8% in Minnesota) while changes in the uninsured rates  
19 over time are very small (typically 1% to 2%), the coefficient of this independent variable  
20 reflects how different uninsurance rates explain CMAD costs variation from state to state.

21

22 The “Rural.Indicator” is a binary variable. It takes on the value of 1 when the data used are from  
23 rural hospitals, and the value zero when the data are from urban hospitals. This binary variable  
24 indicates that the trend line for rural hospitals is lower (*i.e.*, there is a vertical downward shift in  
25 the trend line for rural hospitals)—but with the same slope (*i.e.*, change over time)—than it is for  
26 their urban counterparts. The estimated coefficient indicates that, on average, rural hospitals cost  
27 \$475 less regardless of year. The absolute value of the t statistic (-18.46) is also too large to  
28 conclude that random variation generated the result.

29 The “Dirigo” variable is another binary variable. This binary takes on the value of 1 when the  
30 data used are prior to June 30, 2003 (the end of FY 2003), and the value zero when the data are  
31 post June 30, 2003. As with all binary variables, the Dirigo variable generates a one time vertical

1 shift in the trend line. In this case it shifts the trend line for all hospitals in all states. Although  
2 labeled “Dirigo”, this variable in fact simply divides the data into pre-June 30, 2003 and July 1,  
3 2003 and after. The trend (*i.e.*, the slow and consistent change over time) is unchanged by this  
4 binary variable. However, after 2003, there was a one time drop in costs, estimated at \$285.61,  
5 due to some unique and unspecified event in 2003. (Since the binary has a value of 1 prior to FY  
6 2003 and a value of 0 after, and since the corresponding coefficient is positive, that indicates that  
7 the trend line prior to 2003 was \$285.61 higher than it was post 2003. However, the slope of  
8 both the pre and post 2003 trend lines are unchanged by this binary.) The t statistic (4.39)  
9 indicates that the correlation is statistically significant. Because the cost changes are reflected in  
10 all states, this srHS equation demonstrates that something nationwide—as opposed to something  
11 specific to Maine—has generated a vertical shift in this trend line in 2004.

12

13 **Q. Before moving on to the remainder of the variables in the table, do any of your**  
14 **calculations of the t statistics or statistical significance involve subjective judgment on your**  
15 **part?**

16 A. No. The interpretation of the t statistics and other standardized output from the  
17 regression are not open to subjective judgment. Since the statistical software does not know if  
18 the researcher is proposing a one tail or a two tail test, most software outputs probabilities (the  
19 “Sig” values in the above table) for a two tail test. A two tail test would be appropriate if the  
20 explanatory variable could cause positive or negative changes in the dependent variable. The  
21 srHS regression makes the presumption that the Dirigo legislation could only decrease health  
22 care costs and could not possibly increase costs. Given that health care related legislation has  
23 had a long history of increasing health care costs, I would not make that presumption. That said,  
24 presuming, as srHS did, that the Dirigo legislation can only decrease costs, we would need to do  
25 a one tailed test. Instead of looking to see if the probability (Sig value) is less than 5%, we need  
26 to determine from standard t tables the t value associated with 5% probability in the lower left  
27 tail of the t distribution. We would then compare the actual t value to this “critical” t value. If  
28 the actual t value is lower than the critical t (larger in absolute value but negative in sign) then  
29 we would reject the hypothesis that there is no correlation between the dependent and  
30 explanatory variables. That is, the difference between the estimated coefficient and zero are too  
31 large to be reasonably explained by random variation.

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**Q. Having said that, does the table from the srHS regression also contain variables that are statistically insignificant?**

A. Yes, there are several and they are critical to the results. Below I will describe each such variable, what it was intended to measure and the results that demonstrate that each is statistically insignificant and therefore should have been excluded from the final srHS model.

The “Maine” variable is a binary variable. This binary takes on the value of 1 when the data used are from Maine, and the value zero when the data are from any other state. This variable represents an attempt to test the hypothesis that CMAD costs are higher in Maine (other factors taken into consideration) than in the rest of the nation (on average). This variable generates a vertical shift in the trend line for Maine hospitals. The trend is unchanged by this binary variable; however, Maine hospital CMAD costs are estimated to be \$432.62 higher (on average) than hospitals in any other states in any year. The t statistic (1.39) indicates that this coefficient is not statistically significant. Put differently, this t statistic reflects that there is a greater than 5% chance that the estimated coefficient is generated by random variation. Using standard conventions this variable should have been removed from the final srHS model.

The “MDD” variable is an interaction term, that is a term used when two or more explanatory variables are multiplied together. In this case the “Maine” binary and the 2003 event binary labeled “Dirigo” are multiplied together. Our use of the earlier Maine binary reflects the assumption that Maine hospital costs are higher than those of other states simply because they are in Maine. This interaction term represents an attempt to test the hypothesis that after FY 2003 there was a one time change in costs (*i.e.*, that did not change the slope of the trend line) that was unique to Maine. The coefficient indicates that the line appears to have shifted by \$65.45. However, since the absolute value of the t statistic associated with this coefficient (-0.066) is so small, the result is not statistically significant. This means that the srHS model has not proven that Maine hospital costs experienced a statistically significant one time cost shift after FY 2003. Instead, the estimated coefficient is the result of random variation. This variable should be removed from the final model.

1 The “M~~D~~Y” is another interaction term. In this case, the “Maine” binary and the trend variable  
2 “Year” are multiplied together. By introducing an additional trend component (M~~D~~Y=Y) for  
3 Maine only (for Maine only because M=1 only if the data is from a Maine hospital; M=0 for  
4 hospitals from any other state), this interaction term represents an attempt to test the hypothesis  
5 that the cost trend (slope of the trend line) has always been steeper in Maine. The estimated  
6 coefficient indicates that the slope of the CMAD average cost line is \$130.74 (per year) steeper  
7 in Maine (2000 to 2007). The t statistic associated with this coefficient is 0.7827, far less than  
8 half of what is needed to achieve statistical significance. This means that the srHS model does  
9 not reflect that Maine’s costs had been increasing at a rate different from the rest of the nation.  
10 The estimated coefficient is the result of random variation. This variable should be removed  
11 from the final model.

12  
13 The “M~~D~~Y~~D~~D” is another interaction term. It is generated by multiplying the “Maine” binary  
14 (1 for Maine, 0 otherwise) by the “Dirigo” binary (1 for pre June 30, 2003, 0 for post June 30,  
15 2003) by year (the trend variable). By introducing this additional trend component only for  
16 Maine and only after FY 2003 (M~~D~~D~~D~~Y=Y only for Maine FY 2003 and prior; 0 for any other  
17 state and for Maine post FY 2003), this interaction term represents an attempt to test the  
18 hypothesis that the cost trend (slope of the trend line) is different after 2003 for Maine only. The  
19 coefficient indicates that after 2003 the slope of the CMAD average cost line changed by \$32.22  
20 (per year) in Maine only. Since the absolute value of the t statistic associated with this  
21 coefficient (-0.136) is so small, the result is not statistically significant. It is the result of random  
22 variation. This means that the srHS model has not proven that cost increases over time in Maine  
23 after 2003 is different from Maine’s cost trend prior to 2003. This variable should be removed  
24 from the final model.

25

26 **Q. Please summarize how these statistical significance results would affect your opinion**  
27 **on the validity of the srHS regression model in calculating cost savings?**

28 A. In the U.S. hospital equation there are only two variables that can conceivably be used in  
29 an attempt to measure savings that may be correlated with the Dirigo variable. They are term  
30 tests for a reduction in the annual rate of increase in costs after FY 2003. The first term test,

1 “MDD” tests for a one time reduction in costs after 2003 (a vertical drop in the trend line). The  
2 second, “MDDDY” tests for a reduction in the annual rate of increase in costs after 2003 (a  
3 decrease in the slope of the trend line). The “Dirigo” or “D” binary variable tests for a one time  
4 reduction in costs for all U.S. hospitals after 2003, and the “MDY” term tests for a higher annual  
5 trend in Maine costs prior to 2004.

6 Independent of the other problems with the analysis that I have identified in this testimony as  
7 well as those discovered by Dr. Dobson and Mr. Burke, the lack of statistical significance to test  
8 terms “MDDDY” and “MDD” (the only variables in the srHS regression model that can  
9 conceivably correlate Dirigo savings) renders the model invalid for purposes of determining  
10 AMCS.

11

12 **Q. Does that complete your testimony concerning the statistical insignificance of the**  
13 **srHS U.S. hospital regression model?**

14 A. Yes. I will now move on to the point that the srHS model also failed to include factors  
15 that clearly affect hospital costs and should have been included as potential explanatory variables  
16 in the srHS U.S. model (and in models for any sample of states).

17 **Q. Please describe the first factor that should have been included in the srHS analysis**  
18 **as a potential explanatory variable.**

19 A. As a threshold matter, I would like to state that the dependent variable that srHS selected  
20 (cost per CMAD) is not appropriate to measure the cost savings from a cost of care intervention.  
21 This is dealt with more directly later in my testimony. Assuming, however, that cost per CMAD  
22 were an appropriate dependent variable, for the reasons discussed below, the first potential  
23 explanatory variables I would look to are economic variables such as employment growth rate.  
24 Inexplicably, srHS did not include state employment growth rate or similar economic drivers in  
25 its model.


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27 Changes in economic factors are so powerful that they affect cost and output in every industry in  
28 the U.S. economy. Aggregate economic variables such as gross state product, unemployment

1 rates and inflation should always be given serious consideration in any model using socio-  
2 economic data (especially economic data such as costs). For example, employment growth rates  
3 are powerful drivers of change in every industry, and especially so for the health care sector  
4 since the overwhelming majority of commercial subscribers receive their medical insurance  
5 through their employers. Changes in the level of employment will effect the percent of the  
6 population with medical insurance and thereby the level of medical spending. Since so much of  
7 the under 65 population gets its insurance through employers, as employment levels grow, so too  
8 do those who have insurance. In a growing economy, employers who offer insurance will hire  
9 more employees, some employers who had not previously offered insurance to their employees  
10 will be able to afford to do so, and, as per capita income grows, more employees will be able to  
11 afford their insurance co-shares, co-pays and deductibles. Not only does the number of insured  
12 lives increase, utilization rates for the insured increase as well. As a result, the growth in  
13 hospital revenues accelerates. As hospital revenues grow, the financial need for increases in  
14 reimbursement rates (*i.e.*, the average cost of a discharge or outpatient visit) eases. The growth  
15 in CMAD average cost should slow.

16  
17 On the national level, by 2003, years of declining employment growth rates throughout the  
18 United States were contributing to the growing rates of uninsured, which in turn put downward  
19 pressure on hospital revenues and profit margins. These declining profit margins put pressure on  
20 hospitals to push for higher prices (*i.e.*, cost per discharge and cost per outpatient visit). When  
21 employment growth rates turned positive in 2004, the increase in the insured population resulting  
22 from the increase in employment allowed hospitals to ease up on their demands for higher per  
23 discharge/visit cost increases.

24 While a similar cycle occurred in Maine, the cost growth fluctuation was exacerbated because  
25 Maine experienced a much longer recession in employment growth (including 3 years of zero  
26 growth from 2001 to 2003) than the rest of the United States (see graph below). The length and  
27 depth of the recession in Maine would have put far more financial pressure on Maine hospitals to  
28 increase reimbursement rates (*i.e.*, cost growth) than it did on U.S. hospitals in general. When  
29 employment growth turned positive in 2004, the financial pressure on Maine's hospitals eased  
30 for the first time in three years.



1

2 The above graph reflects that the recovery in employment growth rates for the U.S. and  
 3 especially for Maine is coincident with the phase change (from 1 to 0) for the 2004 “Dirigo”  
 4 binary variable in the srHS models. Put differently, this means that employment growth in  
 5 Maine was stagnant in the years that preceded 2004. Fewer jobs means fewer insureds and,  
 6 hence, higher hospital cost growth. Starting in 2004, when employment growth in Maine  
 7 accelerated, there were more jobs and more people covered by their employers’ insurance, which  
 8 in and of itself should lead to a deceleration of hospital cost growth. Since the employment  
 9 growth factor is absent from the srHS model as a potential explanatory variable, the impact that  
 10 positive and increasing employment growth has on growth of health care costs is likely to be  
 11 improperly picked up by the 2004 “Dirigo” binary and/or any interaction term that is constructed  
 12 using the 2004 “Dirigo” binary.

13

14 **Q. What does it mean that the srHS model likely is picking up the impact of the post-**  
 15 **2003 employment growth?**

16 A. It means that the srHS estimated coefficients are biased. Put differently, independent of  
 17 the statistical insignificance of the factors that are critical to the model (variables “MDDY”  
 18 and “MDD”), the failure to include employment growth rates as a potential explanatory variable  
 19 invalidates the statistical results of the srHS regression model because anticipated deceleration of

1 cost growth associated with increased employment growth is included in the “savings” that the  
2 srHS model incorrectly attributes to Dirigo.

3 Since this shift from declining or zero employment growth to positive employment growth  
4 occurred exactly when the “Dirigo” binary variable changes phase in the srHS model, the  
5 “savings” that srHS attributes to Dirigo may, in large part, be due to changing economic  
6 fortunes. This is a more likely scenario given that economic factors have been consistently  
7 established in the research literature as powerful drivers of industry. The health care industry, at  
8 over 20% of GDP, is not exempt from those forces.

9

10 **Q. Your explanation seems to suggest that hospital operating margins should have been**  
11 **considered as an additional explanatory variable in the srHS model. Is that correct?**

12 A. Yes. Hospital operating margins will also have a significant effect on cost per case.  
13 Hospitals with slim or negative operating margins are under pressure to increase revenues and  
14 that leads to increased costs per case. By contrast, when hospital operating margins are more  
15 robust, the pressure to increase revenues is diminished and there is consequently less cost  
16 growth. Employment growth rates will have a strong influence on profit margins, but they are  
17 not the only factor operating on profit margins. Profit margins will have some movement that is  
18 independent of employment growth. As such, srHS should have (but did not) test hospital  
19 margin in the model along with employment growth rates. The graph provided by srHS shows  
20 that hospital operating margins in Maine improved in 2004 and after, which for the reasons  
21 stated above, eased the need for hospitals to increase their costs per case. Thus, even if srHS’s  
22 model did not have any of the other deficiencies mentioned herein, the inclusion of employment  
23 growth rates and hospital profit margins would have dramatically changed their estimate of the  
24 Dirigo savings. Put differently, even aside from the other serious flaws in srHS’s model, the fact  
25 that the srHS model does not control for two well-known factors generating hospital cost  
26 increases (*i.e.*, employment growth and operating margins) demonstrates that the model is  
27 fundamentally flawed and cannot be relied upon.

28

1 **Q. In addition to the variables lacking statistical significance, you mentioned previously**  
2 **that there are problems with srHS's state cluster analysis. Please explain the problems**  
3 **with those clusters.**

4 A. The Cluster 1 sample was not randomly selected. For starters, it is **unusually small** with  
5 only six states. Even though there are multiple hospitals within a state, they are all subject to the  
6 same state economic conditions and the same set of laws and regulations concerning health care  
7 and health care costs and operations. Changes in the economic conditions and regulatory  
8 environment will move the actual values for all hospitals in a specific state in a similar direction  
9 and by a similar magnitude. The resulting error terms (actual minus predicted) will move  
10 together in a similar fashion. They are not independent, and thus violate the basic *iid* assumption  
11 that underlies srHS's regression methodology. As a result, there is even more potential that the  
12 estimated coefficients are biased and that their statistical significance is lower than the calculated  
13 t statistics indicate.


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15 **Q. Did you find other problems with srHS's use of the Cluster 1 sample as a**  
16 **benchmark for Maine?**

17 A. Yes, the states srHS selected have significantly disparate characteristics that make them  
18 inappropriate to create a valid benchmark for Maine. For example:

- 19 • The Cluster 1 sample includes Louisiana (LA) which had a double dip recession in  
20 employment growth rates due to hurricane Katrina (see graph below).
- 21 • Cluster 1 includes Utah (UT) which had nearly 2½ times the average job growth of the  
22 U.S., but was one of only a few states to have rising uninsured rates (an extraordinary  
23 2½% point increase in the uninsured population from 2004 to 2007).
- 24 • Cluster 1 states Colorado (CO) and New Mexico (NM) had employment growth rates that  
25 were approximately three times that of Maine.

- 1       • This six state Cluster 1 sample includes three economically and sociologically related,  
2       adjacent states in the Southwest (CO, NW, UT). That is highly unusual, especially when  
3       compared to Maine, a state in the Northeast.
- 4       • The ethnic make-up of the Cluster 1 states also renders the sample inappropriate.  
5       According to the U.S. Census Bureau, in 2004, Maine was 96% White/Caucasian and  
6       less than 1% each for Black and Latino. MN was the closest at 87% White, 4% Black  
7       and 3% Latino. Race differences start to become pronounced in UT, with a sizeable  
8       Latino population at 10%, a White population representing 84%, and a Black population  
9       of only 1%. In CO, the minority difference with Maine becomes even more dramatic:  
10      CO is 19% Latino, 73% White, and 4% Black. In LA, the dominate minority is the Black  
11      population at a sizable 33% (compare to Maine’s less than 1%), with the White  
12      population accounting for 62% and the Latino population for 3%. In NM, the “minority”  
13      population outnumbers the White/Caucasian population. NM is only 44% White  
14      (compared to Maine’s 96%), 43% Latino, and 2% Black. There are significant ethnic  
15      differences between Maine and Cluster 1 states UT and CO. The differences become  
16      dramatic when we compare Maine to LA and NM. Given that there are dramatic  
17      differences nationally in insurance rates for different ethnic groups (*i.e.*, White/Caucasian  
18      compared to Black or Latino), Cluster 1 is not a good benchmark for Maine.
- 19      • There are also large differences in age among the Cluster 1 sample states. Again,  
20      according to the U,S. Census Bureau, in 2005, the median age in Maine was 41 years.  
21      MN and NM were the closest with median ages of 36 and 36½ respectively, but in terms  
22      of population dynamics, that difference is very significant. Age differences are even  
23      greater when we look at CO and LA at 35 each. With an average of 28, UT cannot be  
24      compared to Maine. Given that there are dramatic differences in insurance rates of  
25      different age groups, Cluster 1 is not a good benchmark for Maine.



1

2

3 **Q. Do these differences render Cluster 1 an invalid sample?**

4 A. Yes. Among other things, having such a large portion of a small sample concentrated in  
 5 one small geographic region of the country, with similar socio-economic conditions that are  
 6 dramatically different from Maine, does not make for a valid benchmark.

7 What is important about the differences discussed above is that the response of Maine to  
 8 changing socio-economic factors will be different from the other states in Cluster 1 because of  
 9 dramatic differences in employment growth, age and race. Insurance rates among minorities are  
 10 much lower than they are for White/Caucasian populations. Additionally, insurance rates among  
 11 younger age groups are much lower than they are for the older groupings. Socio-economic  
 12 events that would tend to decrease uninsured rates will have a smaller effect in states with greater  
 13 concentrations of minorities and/or younger populations than they will in Maine. This makes it  
 14 almost impossible to determine what role, if any, Dirigo played in cost growth using Cluster 1.

15

16 **Q. Did you note other problems that call into question the validity of Cluster 1?**

1 A. Yes. As reflected in the table below, Cluster 1 was the only one of four samples (Cluster  
2 1, Cluster 2, a grouping of states compiled by the Brookings Institute for comparison purposes  
3 for the state of Maine, and the New England states) where the percentage of insured actually  
4 increased from 2004 to 2007. Cluster 2's percent insured decreased by 0.7% points (0.8% points  
5 without Maine in the calculations). The Brookings cluster percentage insured decreased by 0.4%  
6 points (with or without Maine in the calculations). The New England states experienced a 0.4%  
7 point decrease in the percent uninsured (0.2% points without Maine in the calculations). Cluster  
8 1's percent insured increased by 0.2% points (0.4% points without Maine in the calculations).

9 Further, like in the U.S. hospital analysis, the two variables critical to testing for Dirigo  
10 correlated savings ("MDDY" and "MDD") in Cluster 1 are not statistically significant. That  
11 the "MDDY" test term comes close to achieving statistical significance (the t statistic's  
12 absolute value of 1.6413 nears the critical t value of 1.645) is not surprising. What the  
13 coefficient for the "MDDY" interaction may be telling us is that people in Maine had a  
14 different health care/insurance related response to socio-economic changes in 2004 than people  
15 in the other states of Cluster 1. This is exactly what we would have expected given the dramatic  
16 age and ethnic differences between Maine and the rest of Cluster 1. Put differently, because srHS  
17 used a cluster of states that are dramatically different in several basic characteristics that would  
18 inherently produce different cost per CMAD results, any correlative value resulting from this  
19 flawed cluster is simply invalid as it is merely picking up those fundamental differences among  
20 these states.

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US Census Bureau: 2005 to 2007 Annual Social & Economic Supplements							
% Uninsured		% Uninsured		% Uninsured		% Uninsured	
Cluster 1	%	Cluster 2	%	Brookings	%	New England-ME	%
Colorado	16.5%	Hawaii	9.0%	Vermont	11.0%	Vermont	11.0%
Louisiana	18.5%	Idaho	15.0%	Michigan	10.5%	New Hampshire	10.5%
Minnesota	8.5%	Nebraska	11.0%	Wyoming	14.0%	Rhode Island	10.0%
New Mexico	21.0%	New Hampshire	10.5%	South Dakota	11.5%	Connecticut	10.5%
Utah	16.0%	New Mexico	21.0%	North Dakota	11.0%	Massachusetts	10.5%
Maine	9.5%	Rhode Island	10.0%	Montana	17.0%	Maine	9.5%
simple Avg	15.0%	West Virginia	15.5%	West Virginia	15.5%	simple Avg	10.3%
Avg w/o Maine	16.1%	Maine	9.5%	Arkansas	17.5%	Avg w/o Maine	10.5%
		simple Avg	12.7%	Iowa	9.5%		
		Avg w/o Maine	13.1%	New Hampshire	10.5%		
				Maine	9.5%		
				simple Avg	12.5%		
				Avg w/o Maine	12.8%		

US Census Bureau: Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in the US: 2004							
% Uninsured		% Uninsured		% Uninsured		% Uninsured	
Cluster 1	%	Cluster 2	%	Brookings	%	New England-ME	%
Colorado	16.5%	Hawaii	10.0%	Vermont	10.5%	Vermont	10.5%
Louisiana	19.0%	Idaho	17.5%	Michigan	11.5%	New Hampshire	10.5%
Minnesota	8.0%	Nebraska	11.0%	Wyoming	15.0%	Rhode Island	10.5%
New Mexico	21.5%	New Hampshire	10.5%	South Dakota	12.0%	Connecticut	11.0%
Utah	13.5%	New Mexico	21.5%	North Dakota	11.5%	Massachusetts	11.0%
Maine	10.5%	Rhode Island	10.5%	Montana	18.0%	Maine	10.5%
simple Avg	14.8%	West Virginia	16.0%	West Virginia	16.0%	simple Avg	10.7%
Avg w/o Maine	15.7%	Maine	10.5%	Arkansas	16.5%	Avg w/o Maine	10.7%
		simple Avg	13.4%	Iowa	10.0%		
		Avg w/o Maine	13.9%	New Hampshire	10.5%		
				Maine	10.5%		
				simple Avg	12.9%		
				Avg w/o Maine	13.2%		

1

2 In summary, Cluster 1 does not provide a valid benchmark for Maine. Among other data points,

3 LA with its double dip jobs recession and UT with an employment growth rate of 2½ times the

4 national average but with a 2½% point increase in the uninsured point likely had a significant

5 impact on the sample. Further, CO and NM have so much in common with UT that they polarize

6 the sample. Simply put, Cluster 1 is not an appropriate benchmark for Maine.

1 **Q. What does the srHS model suggest for CMAD savings?**

2 A. The srHS model calculates \$147.9 million in CMAD savings.

3 **Q. Based on your review of the srHS model, is that calculation an accurate**  
4 **reflection of the amount of cost savings that are attributable to Dirigo?**

5 A. The answer is no. The statistically insignificant coefficients for the “MDD” and  
6 “MDDYDD” terms which are critical to the hypothesis that Dirigo changed (*i.e.*, reduced) CMAD  
7 costs in Maine should not be used to calculate savings correlated to Dirigo. In addition, even if  
8 the results that are critical to srHS’s model were statistically significant (which they are not)  
9 srHS’s violation of the fundamental iid requirement means that the calculated t statistics may be  
10 biased upwards, which calls into question the statistical significance of all coefficients.

11 Further, the use of the coefficients from the Cluster 1 regression when Cluster 1 was not a  
12 randomly selected sample, and thus inappropriate and unreasonable to use for a Maine  
13 benchmark/comparison group, clearly biases the “savings” calculation upwards.

14 In short, srHS’s use of a badly mis-specified model invalidates all their results. The model is  
15 mis-specified because it fails to include the all-important economic and hospital financial  
16 variables in their proper mathematical form with appropriate lags.

17

18 **Q. In addition to numerous other flaws, Dr. Dobson noted that the dependent variable**  
19 **(cost per CMAD) should have been logged. Do you agree?**

20 A. Yes. Proper mathematical formulation would be the log of the dependent variable.  
21 Historically, U.S. health care costs have exhibited a constant rate of growth. “Log linear”  
22 estimation will return a constant rate of growth. If one runs regressions on the original dollar  
23 measures of cost, as srHS has done, it will return costs that grow at a constant dollar amount. If  
24 costs are growing at a constant dollar amount each year, then the rate of growth (the constant \$  
25 increase divided by an ever growing prior period \$ amount) will decrease each year. If you then  
26 calculate rates of growth based on values predicted by the equation you will get declining rates

1 of growth that are the result of basic mathematics, even if there were no “real” decline in the  
2 growth of costs.

3

4 **Q. Are there other indicia that suggest that the srHS model was mis-specified?**

5 A. Yes. Model mis-specification is further indicated by the presence of different variables in  
6 the U.S. hospital and Cluster 1 equations, and the instability of the coefficients of the variables  
7 that are common to both equations. Consider that the “Rural Indicator”, “Interns per Bed”, and  
8 the measure of “Uninsured” are in the U.S. Hospital equation but not the Cluster 1 equation. The  
9 “Critical Access Indicator” and the “% Medicaid Days” are in the Cluster 1 equation but not the  
10 U.S. hospital equation. The coefficient for “Total Beds” experiences an eight-fold increase from  
11 0.1095 in Cluster 1 to 0.8724 in the U.S. hospital data set. The “% Medicare Days” shrink by  
12 80% from -6611 in Cluster 1 to -1332 in U.S. hospital. A robust, well-specified model should  
13 work reasonably well regardless of the sample chosen. If the coefficients and variables are  
14 inconsistent (as they are in the srHS model), that is an indication of a badly specified model.

15 All of the above points lead me to conclude that the srHS results are invalid and cannot be relied  
16 upon. Undoubtedly, some of the factors identified in the srHS study may be correlated to  
17 CMAD costs. However, the lack of a complete model and the biases introduced prevent us from  
18 knowing how much of a savings, if any, has been generated by Dirigo.

19

20 **Q. Your testimony indicates that both the U.S. hospital analysis and the Cluster  
21 1 analysis employed by srHS were statistically unsound?**

22 A. Yes, for the reasons described above, both analyses are fatally flawed.

23

24 **Q. Mr. Schramm seems to concede in his prefiled testimony that neither the U.S.  
25 hospital analysis nor the Cluster 1 analysis can produce results that accurately  
26 predict savings that are correlated to Dirigo on its own, but suggests that blending**

1 **the two cures the flaws. Does this suggestion—that blending the results from two**  
2 **faulty models together can create new results with stronger predictive and**  
3 **explanatory power –make sense from a statistical and econometric standpoint?**

4 A. No. The blending of results from two different models is highly unusual. If a  
5 researcher has a properly specified model, the results from the larger sample should be  
6 used as smaller samples are more prone to biased results. “Blending” two regressions  
7 that are mis-specified cannot correct the flaws that are inherent to each regression. The  
8 science of statistics does not stray from the maxim “two wrongs do not make a right.”  
9 Generally speaking, two faulty data sets fused together do not somehow produce a  
10 statistically valid result.

11

12 **Q. Mr. Schramm suggests that the U.S. regression has predictive value (though**  
13 **admitting a lack of statistical significance) and that Cluster 1 (though a small and**  
14 **potentially biased sample) has explanatory value. Do you agree?**

15 A. No. The U.S. hospital analysis and the Cluster 1 analysis are not data sets where  
16 one corrects the flaws in the other, thereby making the blended results stronger than the  
17 initial outputs. To the contrary, even it were appropriate statistical technique to blend  
18 two analyses in an attempt to correct deficiencies (which it is not) rather than offsetting  
19 opposite deficiencies, the two analyses are embedded with the same flaws. As explained  
20 above, both the U.S. hospital analysis and the Cluster 1 analysis failed to remove  
21 variables that demonstrate no statistical significance, including the only variables in the  
22 srHS regression model that can conceivably measure Dirigo savings (“MDDY” and  
23 “MDD”). Further, both models failed to include economic and financial variables that  
24 are important drivers of health care costs--variables such as employment growth and  
25 hospital operating margin, thereby invalidating the estimates for the coefficients of the  
26 included variables. Simply put, the results srHS produced from blending and weighting  
27 the U.S. hospital analysis and the Cluster 1 analysis are no more explanatory or predictive  
28 than the fundamentally flawed results those two models exhibited on their own.

1 **Q. Even if the srHS model properly measured declines in cost growth that are actually**  
2 **attributable to Dirigo, in your opinion as a statistician and health economics expert, is a**  
3 **system wide analysis of changes in CMAD an appropriate mechanism to determine true**  
4 **cost growth declines?**

5 A. No. The use of CMAD formula to measure the cost containment performance of  
6 **individual hospitals** may indeed be appropriate. Even though the admit rate and the mix of  
7 cases should be stable for an entire health care system such as the state of Maine, random  
8 variation and competition among hospitals will cause both the number of admits and case mix at  
9 individual hospitals to vary. Hospitals should not be penalized if healthy competition for  
10 physician and patients generates an increase in admits or a shift in the mix of cases towards more  
11 resource intensive (and costly) admits. Nor should they be rewarded if the mix of cases at their  
12 institution shifts towards less resource intensive (lower cost) admits.

13  
14 However, what is appropriate at the individual level may not be appropriate for an entire system.  
15 Any measure of statewide medical cost control should consider changes in total medical cost.  
16 The CMAD formula only considers one component in the total cost equation, the price (*i.e.*, the  
17 case mix adjusted average cost) of a discharge. The srHS approach then takes the change in the  
18 cost of an admit and multiplies by the current number of discharges. Normally, an increase in  
19 the statewide admit rate would be viewed as an indication of possible overuse of acute care  
20 facilities (*i.e.*, waste). However, using the srHS approach, any increase in admits is interpreted  
21 as an increase in savings as long as the case mix adjusted (“CMA”) cost has declined.

22  
23 An increase in admit rates may even lower CMAD costs. Since hospitals have huge fixed costs  
24 in physical plant and equipment, an increase in admits and out patient visits allows the hospital  
25 to spread their fixed costs over a larger patient base, thereby reducing average cost.

26 Additionally, when admit rates go up, more often than not it is because cases at the margin are  
27 now being admitted. Marginal cases are the ones where the patient’s condition may or may not  
28 require admission to an acute care hospital. These patients are not quite as serious and not quite  
29 as expensive to treat as the clear cut cases. Yet the diagnosis codes and procedures done will be  
30 similar, yielding similar Case Mix Index (“CMI”) values but similar or lower costs than those  
31 clear cut admits. If more marginal cases are being admitted, then there is a strong presumption  
32 that acute care facilities are being inappropriately utilized. However, the CMI may stay the same

1 and the CMAD cost may fall. Even where there is some cost savings from improved efficiency  
2 the CMAD formula will overstate those ‘saving’ by multiplying by an admit rate which can be  
3 inflated by inappropriate/excessive hospitals admits.

4  
5 **Q. Dr. Dobson’s analysis reflects that the srHS model will calculate “savings”**  
6 **correlated to Dirigo in many other states that are not subject to the Dirigo Health**  
7 **legislation. As a statistician and econometrician, are you surprised by this?**

8 A. No. The statistical insignificance of the results from the srHS model means that  
9 random variation can result in a “savings” calculation and, as such, “savings” can be  
10 generated in any state. Additionally, the exclusion of important explanatory variables,  
11 such as employment growth and operating margin, can likewise generate such “unusual”  
12 results. Use of an inappropriate cluster as a benchmark further undermines the srHS  
13 model. LA had the “double dip” employment growth recession, UT had that unusual  
14 2½% increase in uninsured rates, and CO, NM and UT had employment growth rate 1½ to  
15 2½ times greater than national rate. The use of such an unusual benchmark is bound to  
16 result in “savings” for states similar to Maine.

17

18 **Q. Why is this not surprising given that those other states do not have Dirigo?**

19 A. In the first instance, the srHS model suggests that they attempted to measure the  
20 effects of “Dirigo”, but as I noted above, the variable labeled “Dirigo” and the interaction  
21 created using the “Dirigo” binary variable in the srHS model are not “Dirigo” at all.  
22 Rather, those variables simply partition the data between two time periods; *i.e.*, the time  
23 period before FY 2004 and the time period including and after FY 2004. Instead of  
24 actually measuring declines in cost growth that are correlated to Dirigo, the srHS model  
25 measures declines after 2004 and assumes that if cost growth slows more in the target  
26 state than the benchmark, not only is it potentially correlated to Dirigo, it is actually  
27 attributable to Dirigo. As I testified above, the mis-specification of the model by failing  
28 to control for employment growth and hospital operating margin changes (and other  
29 potential economic and hospital specific financial factors) is one of the most serious

1 flaws in the srHS model. The srHS model is not in reality measuring cost growth decline  
2 that is correlated to Dirigo, but instead is simply measuring variations in the rate of cost  
3 growth across different states. Because of different economic, sociological, and  
4 regulatory conditions, there will be different rates of cost growth, both before and after  
5 2004, among the states. This will be especially true for the state of Maine which  
6 experience a longer and deeper economic pre-Dirigo recession than the rest of the  
7 country.

8

9 **Q. In his testimony Dr. Dobson suggests that the srHS model should have**  
10 **included additional dependent variables beyond employment growth and operating**  
11 **margin. Do you have any comment on this?**

12 A. Yes. Many of Dr. Dobson's variables are simply "component" variables that  
13 determine hospital profits. "HMO penetration", "Profit/Non-Profit Hospital Status",  
14 "Occupancy Rates" and other components all influence hospital profits. I suggested  
15 "hospital profit / operating margins" as a variable that would easily capture the combined  
16 effect of Dr. Dobson's components. Dr Dobson also suggests "Income Levels and  
17 Wages" which fit the general category of "economic and employment growth" factors  
18 that I suggested. Additionally, Dr Dobson suggests "Race" and "Age" which figured  
19 prominently in my critique of Cluster 1. As such, our views of the variables that were  
20 improperly omitted from the srHS model are entirely consistent.

21

22 **Q. Do you have any comments on the other savings measures proposed by**  
23 **srHS?**

24 A. Yes. Since the turn around in employment growth is correlated with the reduction  
25 in the CMAD growth rate, and since the major logical link is through employment  
26 growth's tendency to increase growth in uninsured rates (all other factors held the same),  
27 then this strongly suggests that savings associated with reductions in bad debt and charity  
28 care are already included in the CMAD measure. Put differently, if employment growth

1 accelerates and creates jobs, this leads to an increase in those with commercial insurance,  
2 which will tend to reduce the cost per CMAD. As such, including the reduction in the  
3 uninsured rates as a separate measure of savings is double counting.

4

5 **Q. Mr. Schramm suggests in his testimony that there is no overlap because their**  
6 **calculation analyzes costs in both the pre- and post-Dirigo periods and determines**  
7 **the BC/CC savings independent of those cost changes. Do you agree?**

8 A. No. The strong link between employment growth rates and uninsured rates  
9 combined with the reversal of employment growth rates after Dirigo (*i.e.*, in 2004)  
10 suggest otherwise.

11

12 **Q. Does this conclude your testimony?**

13 A. Yes.

**Certificate of Service**

I, Christopher T. Roach, Esq. certify that the foregoing Prefiled Testimony of Vincent Maffei was served this day upon the following parties via Electronic Mail.

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